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The Federal Circuit’s Markman decision removed 
juries from the claim interpretation process, thereby 
revolutionizing patent law. Designed to provide greater 
certainty and predictability, Markman nevertheless 
produced unintended consequences, increasing ambiguity 
and complexity. By declaring claim interpretation an 
entirely legal issue, the Federal Circuit imposed intricate 
and even contradictory rules, many resulting from the 
Federal Circuit’s long insistence that no issues of fact 
existed, so that claim construction was entirely subject to 
de novo review. The uncertainty was compounded by rules 
focused on semantic quibbles unrelated to what was 
invented. Increased burdens and continuing uncertainty 
followed. 
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Three tectonic shifts have marked the last seventy years in 
patent litigation. The first resulted from the 1952 patent act, which 
untangled the law and codified a liberal view of how much 
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“invention” was needed for patentability. The second was the 
creation of the Federal Circuit, which removed patent appeals from 
the disinterested or even hostile regional circuit courts, especially 
the rabidly anti-patent Eighth Circuit. The third came from the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc.,1 which separated claim construction from the jury’s 
infringement analysis. Of the three, Markman continues to have 
the greatest impact, with crucial questions still unresolved after 
twenty years. 
Markman was ostensibly intended to produce greater clarity 
and predictability in patent cases by placing the interpretation of a 
patent’s scope solely in the hands of judges—who were asserted to 
be better suited to the intricacies of claim interpretation. 
Underlying the ostensible grounds was a deep enmity toward 
jurors in patent cases and a desire for unimpeded Federal Circuit 
review of patent scope, a desire that had been thwarted by the rise 
of patent juries. Yet Markman produced a host of unexpected 
results: less predictability, district judge irritation, and ever 
increasing litigation costs. But most important was the 
transformation of claim analysis from a focus on the invention to 
an elaborate manipulation of words unhinged from the purpose of 
the patent system. Despite twenty years of refinement, Markman’s 
legacy remains a difficult work-in-progress. 
 
I. THE ROAD TO MARKMAN 
 
Markman arose in response to increasing use of juries, 
especially following the creation of the Federal Circuit. Once jury 
trials began to predominate, dissatisfaction with the competence of 
juries mushroomed, especially among losing defendants and 
attorneys representing companies who had long ignored patents. 
The dissatisfaction grew further as the Federal Circuit transformed 
patent law from a mostly-ignored backwater into an economic 
force, while simultaneously endorsing a broad role for juries. 
Attorneys, corporate counsel, and academics, appalled at juror 
attitudes, jury nullification and juror damage awards, thus sought a 
                                                                                                             
1 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
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way to thwart the juror virus. Simultaneously, the limited review of 
jury decisions frustrated attorneys and some Federal Circuit 
judges. The United States Constitution’s Seventh Amendment2 
imposed a serious obstacle to jury elimination,3 so jury opponents 
looked for a new route to limiting juries. The result was Markman, 
an inelegant tool that limited the role of juries but created a host of 
new problems. 
 
A.  The Rise of Patent Juries 
 
Juries have long been present in patent cases, even before the 
adoption of the Constitution in 1789,4 and the passage of the first 
patent act in 1790.5 Yet until the late 1970s, juries in patent cases 
were the rare exception. Patent attorneys and their clients had little 
experience with juries and jury trials, and were reluctant to deviate 
from common practice. Then, as now, many patent specialists 
                                                                                                             
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved . . . .”). 
3 E.g., Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752–53 (1942) (“The 
right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental 
feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh 
Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether 
guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by statute, should be jealously 
guarded by the courts.”); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) 
(“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and 
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence than any seeming 
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost 
care.”); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (“The trial by jury 
is justly dear to the American people. It has always been an object of deep 
interest and solicitude, and every encroachment upon it has been watched with 
great jealousy.”). 
4 E.g., Winans v. New York & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 88, 100 
(1859); Parker v. Hulme, 18. F. Cas. 1138 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 10,740); 
Turner v. Winter, [1787] 99 Eng. Rep. 1274 (K.B.); Arkwright v. Nightingale, 
[1785] 1 Carp. P.C. 38 (C.P.); Liardet v. Johnson, [1778] 1 Carp. P.C. 35 (K.B.) 
(discussed in 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE 
GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 748 (1992)). 
5 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–12 (1790). The Act provided, 
among other things, that the patent owner can be awarded “such damages as 
shall be assessed by a jury . . . .” 
4
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viewed juries with alarm; they were considered incompetent to 
handle complex technology, and the specialists assumed federal 
judges, all of whom had higher than average intelligence, were 
more suited to dealing with the technical and legal esoterica arising 
in nearly every patent case. Moreover, a general movement 
challenging the suitability of juries in complex cases gained 
momentum in the 1970s,6 giving patent litigants further 
ammunition to try to avoid juries.7 
Despite the common disdain for patent juries, a 
countermovement arose in the 1970s, based upon a simple belief: 
jurors decided patent cases differently from judges, and that 
difference benefited patent owners more than defendants.8 That 
                                                                                                             
6 Much of the movement arose after the famous footnote 10 in Ross v. 
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), which seemed to suggest that the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury hinged, in part, on “the practical abilities and 
limitations of juries.” Id. at 538 n.10. District courts then rejected juries in 
complex cases in a late 70s flurry, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 
458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 
F.R.D. 59, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 
705 (S.D. Cal. 1977); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. 
Wash. 1976). The movement culminated in the Third Circuit’s decision in In re 
Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 
1980), holding that the Fifth Amendment due process clause created a 
“complexity” exception to the right to jury trials in civil cases. Many scholars 
called for the end of juries in complex cases. E.g., James S. Campbell, Complex 
Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 965 
(1980); Kathy E. Davidson, The Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Litigation, 20 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 329 (1978). The issue was not formally resolved by the 
Supreme Court, and the “complexity” exception remains the subject of 
discussion even today. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if 
Patents are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673 (2013). 
7 See, e.g., Gary M. Ropski, Constitutional and Procedural Aspects of the 
Use of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part I), 58 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
609, 616 (1976) (“Ross may provide support for the argument that the right to 
jury trial can be limited by the inability of jurors to understand the complex 
patents and technology at issue.”). 
8 Early commenters suggested that juries should be considered when 
sympathy is desired for individual inventors or when the defendant is a large 
corporation. See, e.g., George B. Newitt & Jon O. Nelson, The Patent Lawyer 
and Trial by Jury, 1 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 59 (1967). The evidence 
that jurors are pro-patent is now well-established. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, 
Jamie Kendall & Clint Martin, Rush to Judgment? Trial Length and Outcomes 
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difference in outcomes swept most opposition aside. Before the 
1970s, juries rarely appeared in even 10% of the trials.9 By the end 
of the 1970s, patent cases were tried to juries in at least 10%,10 and 
that number steadily increased to 70% by 1994, 11 the year before 
Markman. Despite the ever-present disdain for juror competence, 
most patent litigators concluded by the mid-1980s that proper 
representation of patent owners required a jury demand. Patent jury 
trials then became the norm,12 no doubt spurred by high profile 
plaintiff jury wins, such as the celebrated decision in Roberts v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co.13 Patent litigators were forced to scramble to 
                                                                                                             
in Patent Cases, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 169 (2013); John R. Allison & Mark A. 
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 
185, 213 (1998) (“[J]uries are likely to favor patentees and unlikely to second-
guess the decision of the PTO.”). Interestingly, articles discussing the 
phenomenon were non-existent in the 1970s, although the author remembers the 
topic as one of frequent discussion in patent circles by 1980. An example is 
Ropski, supra note 7, at 612, which merely noted that “the sight of the ribbon 
and seal on the official Letters Patent impresses the jury with the presumption of 
validity.” It may be that practitioners began recognizing the possibilities 
described in scholarly articles in the 1960s, e.g., Ralph W. Launius, Some 
Aspects of the Right to Trial by Jury in Patent Cases, 49 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 112 (1967). 
9 ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND 
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 123 (Princeton University Press 2004). 
The Supreme Court noted in Blonder–Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 
U.S. 313, 336 n.30 (1971), that only 13 of 382 patent trials between 1968 and 
1970 were tried to a jury. 
10 Id. See also HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ & ROBERT J GOLDMAN, PATENT LAW 
AND PRACTICE 130 (2d. ed. 1995) (tabulating data). 
11 Id. 
12 An excellent discussion of the transition from bench to jury trials in 
patent cases is contained in Lemley, supra note 6, at 1675. 
13 723 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1983). Roberts, a non-practicing inventor, sued 
Sears in 1977 for infringement of his patent on a quick-release socket wrench. 
The jury found the then unusual sum of $5 million in damages, which was 
increased by the district court to $8,190,254. Id. at 1328–29. The case generated 
much then unheard of press publicity for a patent case, including an article in 
Time magazine. See Wrenching Sears, TIME, Oct. 23, 1978, available at 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946093,00.html. Interest-
ingly, the key holding by the Seventh Circuit was that patent validity was a legal 
issue, such that jurors could not decide validity in patent cases. Roberts, 723 
F.2d at 1343. The Seventh Circuit also noted, without citation, that 
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gain jury skills in the 1980s, as trials conducted by non-patent 
specialists (who understood juries) produced repeated victories for 
patent owners—in cases where traditional thinking suggested that 
judges would have decided for the defendant. 
The Federal Circuit’s birth in 1982 cemented the role of juries 
in patent suits.14 Created to provide greater uniformity in patent 
law (among other things), the Federal Circuit immediately began 
resolving the patent law differences that had existed among the 
regional circuits.15 The Federal Circuit, however, did not see a 
need to limit the role of juries in patent cases. Despite the Seventh 
Circuit’s 1983 holding that juries could not decide patent validity 
or interpret patent claims,16 the Federal Circuit declined all early 
opportunities to restrain juries. Instead, the Federal Circuit roundly 
approved of juries in patent cases at its first opportunity.17 The 
                                                                                                             
“[c]onstruction of the patent claim . . . is a matter of law for the court,” thereby 
anticipating Markman by twelve years. Id. at 1338. 
14 The Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act 
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 37–39 (1982). It decided its first case 
on October 28, 1982. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (1982). 
15 Those differences included substantial hostility to patents. Perhaps the 
best expression of that hostility can be found in a Congressional study, which 
concluded: “If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the 
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend 
instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would 
be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend 
abolishing it.” STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECON. REVIEW 
OF THE PATENT SYS. 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup, 
Department of Political Economy, Johns Hopkins University). The hostility is 
generally outlined in Martin J. Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 979, 
980–81 (1987). 
16 Roberts, 723 F.2d at 1332. Much of the initial work of the Federal Circuit 
focused on eliminating the conflicts created by the regional circuits, a task the 
Federal Circuit accomplished quickly. See Howard T. Markey, The Federal 
Circuit and Congressional Intent, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 577 (1992). 
17 Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
Among other things, the Federal Circuit (Markey, C.J.) stated “[n]o warrant 
appears for distinguishing the submission of legal questions to a jury in patent 
cases from such submissions routinely made in other types of cases. So long as 
the Seventh Amendment stands, the right to a jury trial should not be rationed, 
nor should particular issues in particular types of case be treated differently from 
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Federal Circuit thereafter repeatedly affirmed use of juries in 
patent cases, including jury construction of claim terms.18 
Combined with a distinctly more “pro-patent” outlook than had 
been exhibited by the regional circuits,19 the Federal Circuit’s 
decisions quickly cemented a prominent juror role in patent cases. 
Juries, once an oddity, now dominated the patent world. 
 
B.  Hostility to Patent Juries 
 
The ascension of patent juries was matched by a growing 
                                                                                                             
similar issues in other types of cases.” Id. The Federal Circuit’s first Chief Judge 
also expressly opined in dicta against eliminating patent juries based upon the 
alleged “complexity” exception: “We discern no authority and no compelling 
need to apply in patent infringement suits for damages a ‘complexity’ exception 
denying litigants their constitutional right under the Seventh Amendment.” SRI 
Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (addendum 
opinion by Chief Judge Markey, joined by Judge Newman). 
18 E.g., Delta X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 415 
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Lemulson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206–07 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 976 (1993); Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Promo 
Produkt Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 
1991); Snellman v. Ricoh Co., 862 F.2d 283, 287–88 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989); Perini Am., Inc. v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 
832 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Tillotson, Ltd. v. Walbro Corp., 831 F.2d 
1033 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 
1017 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d 1510 (Fed. Cir. 1987); 
Data Line Corp. v. Micro Techs., Inc., 813 F.2d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1987); H.H. 
Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384 (Fed. Cir. 1987); 
Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Palumbo v. Don-Joy 
Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park 
Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet 
Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 613 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1037 (1984); McGill, Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 672 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). 
19 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Empirical 
Analysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 112 (2004). Several press 
articles in the 1980s noted the increasing importance of patents resulting from 
the Federal Circuit’s creation. Jill Andresky, A Weapon at Last, FORBES, Mar. 
10, 1986, at 46; Anthony Baldo, Juries Love the Patent Holder, FORBES, June 
17, 1985, at 147; Toni Mack, A Change in the Legal Climate, FORBES, Oct. 7, 
1985, at 41; Nancy Perry & David Kirkpatrick, The Surprising New Power of 
Patents, FORTUNE, June 23, 1986, at 57; Work, Inventors’ Just Rewards, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 3, 1986, at 43. 
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chorus of criticism. Then and now, jurors were assumed 
incompetent to handle patent complexities,20 and every losing 
party in a jury trial blamed the result, at least in part, on jury 
incompetence. Even more damning (from the jury opponent’s 
perspective), jury decisions were hard for the Federal Circuit to 
overturn, a phenomenon that was partially blamed on the absence 
of a written opinion, which prevented identification of any 
particular flaw in the jury’s chain of reasoning. On a broader front, 
the entire concept of juries in patent cases was deemed irrational; a 
steady drumbeat of criticism thus arose, all demanding that jurors 
be restrained.21 All challenges to juries in patent cases were 
ignored when the first Chief Judge, Howard Markey, administered 
the Federal Circuit; Judge Markey’s 1989 retirement opened the 
door to changes, leading first to In re Lockwood,22 then to the 
revolution in Markman. 
 
1. Incompetence and Unpredictability 
 
The leading criticism of patent juries was (and is) that they 
simply lack the competence to effectively resolve matters that 
combined convoluted law, complex technology, and intricate 
facts.23 Often without any data, commentators ridiculed patent 
                                                                                                             
20 A district judge once stated when participating in a panel discussion: 
“Honest to God, I don’t see how you could try a patent matter to a jury. . . . It’s 
like somebody hit you between your eyes with a four-by-four. It’s factually so 
complicated.” Symposium, Judicial Panel Discussions on Science and the Law, 
25 CONN. L. REV. 1127, 1144 (1993) (comments of Alfred V. Covello, J.). See 
also JAFFE, supra note 9, at 195 (describing “the uncontroversial observation 
that the evidence in a patent case can be highly technical, and the average juror 
has little competence to understand and evaluate it”). 
21 E.g., Adelman supra note 15, at 1004–07. 
22 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. 
Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995). Lockwood ruled that a Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial existed in declaratory judgment actions seeking patent 
invalidity, based upon a conclusion that a right to a jury decision on validity 
existed when validity was a defense to an infringement charge. Id. at 976. The 
Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit decision after the patent owner 
withdrew his jury demand. 
23 As early as 1971, litigants argued that “patent cases are too complicated 
and difficult for a jury to deal with.” Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 340 
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juries as irrational,24 and derided the growing trend to demand a 
jury in every patent complaint. Simultaneously, jurors were 
deemed unwilling to exert the effort needed to dig into the 
complex law, facts and technology. Instead, jurors were assumed 
to be consumed by boredom in patent cases, such that they paid no 
attention at trial and thus were incapable of rendering a just verdict 
even if they had been competent.25 
Patent jurors were also deemed unpredictable.26 Critics 
reasoned that, if jurors did not understand the case and did not pay 
attention to the testimony, surely they used a random, 
unfathomable process to reach a conclusion.27 The public was 
thereby deprived of any ability to assess the breadth or validity of 
any given patent, and was without “notice” of the patent’s scope. 
These criticisms were frequently expressed by losing litigants, who 
were dismayed that any jury could have found the accused product 
to be within the asserted patent. And underlying the criticism was 
indignation at those jurors and lawyers who, untutored in the 
mysteries of patent esoterica, would nevertheless trespass on the 
domain of those specialists who had earned their place in the 
patent hierarchy by enduring years of study and training in the 
                                                                                                             
(4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971). See also Ropski, supra note 
7, at 632 (referring to “juror befuddlement and confusion”). 
24 E.g., Ropski, supra note 7, at 632 (“[T]he jury’s lack of technological 
competence forces their potential decision to be the result of chance, not 
reasoned analysis of the evidence presented at trial.”). 
25 See, for example, the statements of a prominent New York practitioner, 
Albert Fey, who commented that “This stuff is even complicated for someone 
with a Ph.D. in engineering . . . . A jury’s eyes glaze over.” Bloomberg Business 
News, Jury Cases on Patent Infringement on Trial, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 12, 
1995, at 2. 
26 Perhaps the leading criticism came in 1993 from a sitting judge on the 
Federal Circuit. See Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing 
Predictability in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1231 (1993). Judge Michel described claim interpretation by jurors as a 
major source of unpredictability and called for construction by judges. Id. at 
1238–39. Interestingly, Judge Michel described predictability as more important 
than fairness where economic rights were at stake. Id. at 1234. 
27 E.g., Ropski, supra note 7, at 610 (noting that attorneys “may have been 
uneasy about placing important cases in the hands of fact-finders who might 
only guess at the correct decision, or base it upon considerations collateral to the 
facts in evidence”). 
10
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glories of patent intricacies.28 The specialists were particularly 
affronted by trial lawyers who lacked the specialists’ particularized 
expertise but who nevertheless proved adept at mesmerizing 
gullible jurors. 
While a few practitioners relished the opportunity to practice 
before juries, patent juries were so roundly criticized that few 
challenged the accepted belief that patent cases would be fairer, 
and more predictable, if all decisions were made by legally trained 
and experienced judges. 
 
2. The Unreviewable “Black Box” 
 
Equally damning in the eyes of the critics was the inability to 
review the logic of jury decisions. Considered a “black box,” jury 
verdicts were the result of an unknown process, hidden in the 
confines of the jury deliberation room. Worse, jury verdicts were 
upheld on appeal unless they were unsupported by substantial 
evidence. Losing litigants (who were often losing defendants) felt 
helpless on appeal, since they were unable to identify logical flaws 
in juror reasoning, and they faced a heavy burden in their attempts 
to overcome verdicts that had at least moderate evidentiary 
support. This was an especially egregious problem when juries 
decided the legal aspects of mixed questions of law and fact. 
In contrast, judicial trial decisions require detailed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, allowing appellate litigants to 
knowledgeably focus the appellate court on the trial judge’s 
alleged errors. No assumptions need be made regarding what facts 
the trial judge accepted or rejected, and the judge’s legal 
conclusions provide an exact map of the analysis leading to the 
judgment. While findings of fact are reviewed under the “clear 
error” standard, judicial conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, 
allowing losing defendants a second bite of the apple. The 
increasing damages awards in the 1980s and early 1990s added 
incentives for defendants who lost at trial to take any actions 
possible to reign in the jury scourge. Together, these factors 
                                                                                                             
28 E.g., id. at 613 (noting “the general attitude of the bar, including the 
judiciary, that the patentee’s request for a jury trial is an indication that the 
patent is weak”). 
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provided a steady pool of bitter opponents of patent juries. 
 
3. The “Irrational” System 
 
Juries in patent cases were also derided as fundamentally 
irrational. A priori, no rationally created legal system would place 
the ultimate decision in high-technology issues with material 
economic and social impact on a near random selection of 
ignorant, untrained, and even occasionally uneducated citizens. In 
the critics’ view, it would be hard to design a less logical approach 
to resolution of high-stakes technology disputes. The “it’s 
irrational” argument was rarely accompanied by reference to 
methodical research demonstrating the unsuitability of juries.29 It 
was, instead, stated as an indisputable fact. The argument 
nevertheless helped fuel the groundswell of opposition to patent 
juries. 
And it all seemed so unnecessary to jury critics. 
Acknowledging that the Seventh Amendment guaranteed a right to 
civil jury trials, critics nevertheless pointed to exceptions that, at 
least in their view, demonstrated that the Constitution did not grant 
a jury right in patent cases. This was most notable in the writing of 
Professor Adelman, who not only excoriated the use of juries, but 
vigorously argued that the Seventh Amendment did not apply—
despite the support for juries expressed by the Federal Circuit.30 
                                                                                                             
29 If juries do not decide issues, then they are decided by judges, and 
scholarly research exists suggesting that judges’ decisions suffer from many 
drawbacks that make it hard to characterize them as better decision makers than 
juries. E.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to 
Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2005). The 
article notes the “striking similarities in the decision making of judges and 
jurors,” and concludes that “judges and jurors generally appear to be influenced 
by similar factors and suffer from many of the same difficulties in making their 
decisions.” Id. at 509. 
30 Professor Adelman first criticized juries in a 1987 article, suggesting that 
“there is little room for juries in patent cases,” noting that judges have “greater 
intelligence and better training, coupled with the ability to control the pace of 
the trial and to study transcript and relevant documents outside the courtroom . . 
. .” Adelman, supra note 15, at 979. He further characterized jury use as 
“unfortunate for the system’s integrity,” because of the “inherent irrationality of 
juries.” Id. at 1006. He reiterated that criticism in 1989 in an article on the 
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The battle lines were drawn, and it only remained to be seen 
whether the pro- or anti-jury forces would prevail. 
 
C.  Lockwood 
 
The first skirmish occurred in In re Lockwood,31 a decision on 
rehearing after a Federal Circuit panel granted a petition for 
mandamus requiring a jury trial on validity. The panel concluded 
that the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial “on 
factual questions relating to validity,”32 and extended the jury trial 
right to declaratory judgment actions for invalidity, even where 
infringement was no longer at issue.33 The decision was consistent 
with past Federal Circuit support for juries, and the refusal of the 
full Federal Circuit to reconsider the issue en banc seemed a strong 
indication that the Federal Circuit would preserve a prominent role 
for patent juries.34 The strength of that trend, however, was 
weakened by a ringing dissent by Judge Nies, joined by Chief 
Judge Archer and Judge Plager,35 who used Lockwood to promote 
their belief that some patent issues could be taken from juries, even 
if juries could not be entirely banished from patent matters. 
Judge Nies’s dissent identified three grounds for preventing 
juries from ruling on patent validity, based upon the importance of 
public rights, the lack of a declaratory judgment route to invalidity 
in English common law before adoption of the Constitution, and 
policy grounds that Judge Nies said favored judges over patent 
                                                                                                             
doctrine of equivalents, suggesting that problems with the doctrine are 
“exacerbated when juries, whose members usually lack both technological and 
legal training.” Adelman, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions 
that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 682 n.34 (1989). He 
continued his criticism after Markman, saying, for example, that “[n]o sane 
country would create a jury system for complex patent trials . . . .” Adelman, 
Patent Claiming in the United States: Central, Peripheral, or Mongrel?, 1 
INTELL. PROP. THEORY 71, 73 (2010). 
31 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. American Airlines, Inc. v. 
Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995). 
32 Id. at 976. 
33 Id. 
34 See cases cited supra note 18. 
35 50 F.3d at 980. 
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juries.36 Of the three, the “public rights” argument became a key 
aspect of Markman and represented part of the foundation for 
Markman’s fact–law distinction. According to Judge Nies, “the 
denomination of an issue as one of law represents a policy decision 
that a judge is more appropriate than a jury to make the 
decision.”37 She also lamented the “black box” of jury room 
decisions,38 and noted that “only a reasoned decision lays the 
foundation for meaningful review.”39 She ended by mourning the 
Federal Circuit precedent that “has been read to require jury 
resolution,” such that “litigants no longer challenge the propriety 
of giving the issue of validity to the jury.”40 These strong words, 
coupled with the rejection of rehearing en banc, anticipated the 
sharp division of the Federal Circuit’s coming decisions on claim 
construction. 




Markman arose from severe hostility to juries—as Judge 
Mayer said in his concurring opinion: “this is not just about claim 
language, it is about ejecting juries from infringement cases.”41 
Most jury opponents wanted complete elimination of patent juries, 
but juries were so abhorred that any limitation of their role seemed 
a worthwhile goal. This dynamic played out in Federal Circuit 
jurisprudence. In a prophetic 1983 analysis of the Federal Circuit, 
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit predicted “deep ‘theoretical 
cleavages’ in patent theory over whether patents should be 
construed liberally to stimulate innovation or narrowly to decrease 
the monopoly power of a patent.”42 Posner’s prediction proved true 
                                                                                                             
36 Id. at 981. 




41 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (Mayer, J., concurring). 
42 Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 
1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 
S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 777 (1983). 
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for the claim construction battle. Before Judge Markey’s 
retirement, the Federal Circuit adhered to the belief that a 
significant jury role strengthened the patent system, and any desire 
among the Federal Circuit for jury limits was suppressed. A 
different view dominated after his retirement: “notice” of the scope 
of a patent became paramount. And since keeping patents narrow 
(and even of zero scope) provides more certainty of a patent’s 
scope, the opposition to the broad interpretations often adopted by 
juries became a strong expression of the desire for greater notice. 
Juror opponents between 1982 and 1995 thus argued multiple 
grounds to limit juries, most of which were not adopted.43 But 
when the Federal Circuit lost the restraint imposed by Chief Judge 
Markey, the efforts to limit juries focused on the “fact–law” 
distinction, which contended that claim interpretation (among other 
issues) was a legal question reserved for judges.44 That view has 
reasonable Supreme Court support,45 but it begged the question of 
whether the ultimate legal determination of claim scope had 
underlying factual issues. To many, claim interpretation seemed a 
mixed question of law and fact (much like contractual 
interpretation), especially when claims were construed (as the 
courts had repeatedly demanded) from the perspective of one 
skilled in the art.46 Undaunted, jury opponents declared that claim 
construction was entirely an issue of law, which would leave no 
fact-finding role for the jury. The Federal Circuit accepted the 
argument in Markman. The Supreme Court side-stepped the fact–
                                                                                                             
43 The most notable limitations were imposed in Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton 
Indus. Prod., Inc., 756 F.2d 1556, 1564–65 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (instructing on 
remand that the “court should instruct the jury on what the claim means”); 
Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 721 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (declaring that “claim interpretation [is] matter for the court to decide and 
to make known to the jury by its instructions”); and Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 
970 F.2d 816, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Claim interpretation is a question of law 
for the court.”). 
44 E.g., Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
45 E.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1854) (“The first 
[question], what is the thing patented . . . [is] a question of law, to be determined 
by the court, construing the letters patent . . . .”). 
46 E.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006). 
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law argument and simply ruled that no constitutional right existed 
to have juries interpret patent claims. And unintended 
consequences resulted, which to this day make up a central part of 
the uncertainties in patent interpretation. 
 
A.  The Federal Circuit Markman Decision 
 
When looked at broadly, the Federal Circuit’s Markman 
decision had a simple holding: “the interpretation and construction 
of patent claims, which define the scope of the patentee’s rights 
under the patent, is a matter of law exclusively for the court.”47 
That decision, while criticized,48 was supported by precedent49 and 
logic; much drama could have been averted if the Federal Circuit 
had left matters at that simple statement. Instead, the Federal 
Circuit added bold declarations of law and claim construction 
procedure that have bedeviled the patent system for two decades. 
Although the Federal Circuit’s additional statements were intended 
to produce greater consistency and predictability in claim 
interpretation, some statements were based upon an unrealistic 
view of patent practice, and some bordered on fantasy. 
The problems arose from the Court’s desire to preclude any 
claim interpretation role for juries, and maximize the Federal 
Circuit’s appellate review. The Federal Circuit rejected its previous 
rulings that were inconsistent with the view that “claim 
construction is strictly a question of law for the court.”50 It then 
focused its bold statements on the fact–law distinction,51 and only 
                                                                                                             
47 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 967 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
48 Circuit Judges Mayer and Rader concurred in the decision, and Circuit 
Judge Newman dissented. Id. at 968. Judge Mayer agreed with the outcome but 
disagreed with the rejection of juries. Id. at 989. Judge Newman disagreed with 
the rejection of juries and said remand was the proper action. Id. at 1026. Judge 
Rader agreed with the outcome and said that the court should not have addressed 
the role of the jury. Id. at 998–99. 
49 See Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330; see also Read Corp., 970 F.2d 816. 
50 Markman, 52 F.3d at 977, 979. 
51 Id. at 976 (“In this case which involves claim construction and a grant of 
JMOL of noninfringement based on claim construction, in order to determine 
whether that grant was correct, we must distinguish law from fact.”). The 
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briefly mentioned public policies that supported exclusive judicial 
claim interpretation.52 It avoided entirely any argument based upon 
the so-called “complexity” exception to the Seventh Amendment. 
That fact–law analysis led to the Federal Circuit’s most 
problematic conclusion: the holding that “the construction given 
the claims is reviewed de novo on appeal.”53 
The Federal Circuit statements explaining claim construction in 
the new, jury-free environment were numerous and varied. Having 
concluded that claim construction was a pure issue of law, the 
Federal Circuit then addressed the impact on the claim 
construction process. Least controversial was the Federal Circuit’s 
conclusion that a district court is “obligated” to construe the patent 
and instruct the jury on its constructions.54 This the district court 
had not done, but the Federal Circuit characterized the omission as 
“harmless error.”55 The Federal Circuit did not explain why other 
district courts could not follow the same procedure: give the entire 
infringement question to the jury and then compare the verdict to a 
proper construction of the claims. Likely driven by the Federal 
Circuit’s desire to limit juries, the unexplained rejection removed 
an option from patent jury practice and mandated that every jury 
case have a Markman proceeding. 
The Federal Circuit reiterated that the “focus” in claim 
construction is still on “the objective test of what one of ordinary 
skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood 
the term to mean.”56 This, of course, has been a bedrock claim 
                                                                                                             
biggest precedential obstacle to this conclusion was Bischoff v Wetherand, 76 
U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1869), which allowed the jury to determine “the character of 
the thing invented” in an invalidity issue. 52 F.3d at 988. The Federal Circuit 
simply punted on the issue, saying, “It is difficult, if not impossible, to discern 
any legal principle from Bischoff that related to claim construction in the context 
of patent infringement.” Id. 
52 Id. at 978–79. The Federal Circuit also analogized claim construction to 
statutory interpretation, which it characterized as an entirely legal analysis. Id. at 
987. 
53 Id. at 979. 
54 Id. at 981–82. 
55 The error was rendered harmless by the district court’s ruling on the post-
trial motion. Id. at 982. 
56 Id. at 986. 
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interpretation principle since the creation of patent claims. Yet the 
principle posed an immediate problem for the new “fact free” 
claim interpretation, because determining what one of ordinary 
skill “understood” has always seemed a fact-intensive, evidentiary 
issue. Similarly, the court recognized the need for expert testimony 
to explain the technology to the district court. That testimony again 
seemed to have a distinctly factual character. Explaining how these 
two fundamental aspects of claim construction were consistent 
with the “entirely legal” conclusion led to Markman’s most 
controversial, and problematic, statements. 
Markman began by noting the established distinction between 
“intrinsic” and “extrinsic” evidence.57 It then embarked on a 
lengthy explanation of how extrinsic evidence may be received to 
construe claims, even conflicting evidence. But the Federal Circuit 
declared no factual issue ever arises from the procedure, even 
when the court accepts some evidence and rejects others. The 
result was a breathtaking declaration: 
Through this process of construing claims by, 
among other things, using certain extrinsic evidence 
that the court finds helpful and rejecting other 
evidence as unhelpful, and resolving disputes en 
route to pronouncing the meaning of claim 
language as a matter of law based on the patent 
documents themselves, the court is not crediting 
certain evidence over other evidence or making 
factual findings.58 
While stated in all seriousness, the Federal Circuit would have 
been hard pressed to make a less logical proclamation. Despite the 
emphatic use of the word “not,” the process described above most 
certainly does involve “crediting certain evidence over other 
evidence,” and no stridency can change that reality. But the bizarre 
conclusion was needed (at least in the view of the Federal Circuit) 
                                                                                                             
57 Id. at 980. The Federal Circuit adopted the position that the prosecution 
history is part of the intrinsic evidence, id., a conclusion that presumes no 
disputes will arise over the events during prosecution—a strange presumption 
given the frequency of patent allowances resulting from examiner interviews. 
58 Id. at 981. 
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to preserve de novo review, so it became part of claim construction 
law for the next two decades. 
The same logic led the Federal Circuit to proclaim that a battle 
of the experts does not create issues of fact or change the de novo 
review standard: 
When legal “experts” offer their conflicting view of 
how the patent should be construed, or where the 
legal expert’s view of how the patent should be 
construed conflicts with the patent document itself, 
such conflict does not create a question of fact nor 
can the expert opinion bind the court or relieve the 
court of its obligation to construe the claims 
according to the tenor of the patent.59 
Although stated in the context of a “legal” expert, the above 
principle applies to technical experts as well (testifying on the 
understanding of a “technician in the field, reading the patent, 
would understand the claims”60), because their testimony is 
“extrinsic evidence” that may be accepted or rejected, depending 
on whether the court finds the evidence “helpful,” without creating 
an evidentiary issue that prevents de novo review.61 
Having concluded that disputed evidence can be resolved 
without any fact finding, the Federal Circuit proceeded to declare 
inventor testimony irrelevant, at least testimony on the nature of 
the invention. Such testimony “is entitled to no deference,” even if 
it describes the understanding of one skilled in the art.62 The 
Federal Circuit made this pronouncement after citing—and 
quoting—a Supreme Court case crediting “the testimony of one of 
the patentees” as the “clearest exposition of the significance which 
the terms employed in the claims had for those skilled in the art.”63 
The Federal Circuit rejected the testimony by Mr. Markman on the 
understanding of one of ordinary skill, and added that, even if the 
                                                                                                             
59 Id. at 983. 
60 Id. at 981. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 983. 
63 Id. at 980 (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 
228, 233 (1942)). 
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testimony were true, it would not “dissuade us from our legal 
construction of the claim based on the patent and prosecution 
history . . . .”64 To ensure no inventor testimony could be credited, 
the Federal Circuit added that an inventor’s intent “is of little or no 
probative weight in determining the scope of the claim . . . .”65 
The Federal Circuit also proclaimed that “extrinsic evidence of 
record cannot be relied upon to change the meaning of the 
claims.”66 In so doing, Markman presaged the decision in 
Phillips,67 which established the specification as the primary 
source of claim interpretation, such that extrinsic evidence could 
not be used to modify a meaning that was apparent from reviewing 
just the patent and its prosecution history.68 Inventor and expert 
testimony, previously a central facet of claim interpretation, 
immediately became secondary to semantic fencing over the use of 
words in the text and prosecution history.69 How and when 
extrinsic evidence could be used when the word’s meaning was not 
apparent became a crucial focus of claim construction arguments, 
with parties arguing over whether the evidence helped understand 
the disputed terms, or instead, improperly sought to change a 
meaning apparent from the specification. 
The Federal Circuit bolstered its Markman opinion by 
explaining various propositions that ranged from naive assertions 
to outright fantasy. Quoting a treatise from 1890, the Federal 
Circuit praised the goal of obtaining “a permanent and universal 
                                                                                                             
64 Id. at 983. 
65 Id. at 985. The Federal Circuit added an exception, saying that the 
inventor’s intent “as documented in the prosecution history” was entitled to 
weight. Id. The court did not explain why one expression of inventor’s intent 
was relevant and another not, but the distinction was presumably based upon the 
availability of the prosecution history to the public. 
66 Id. at 983. This contention is despite the later declaration that “[t]here is 
no parole evidence rule in patent law for obvious reasons.” Id. at 985. 
67 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 
U.S. 1170 (2006). 
68 Id. at 1311–24. 
69 Before Markman, “semantic antics” were roundly condemned by the 
Federal Circuit. E.g., Senmed, Inc. v. Richard–Allan Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 
815, 819 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 
F.2d 1418, 1421–22 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
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definition of [the inventor’s] rights under the patent.”70 While a 
laudable goal, no experienced practitioner would ever expect any 
claim interpretation in a lawsuit to have “universal” application, 
because each new infringer has different products that produce 
different claim construction issues, and a claim construction is only 
“permanent” if adopted by all subsequent courts. Nevertheless, the 
desire for “permanent and universal” constructions inspired the 
Federal Circuit’s relentless cleaving to de novo review. Similarly, 
the Federal Circuit reiterated the view that the prosecution history 
represented an “undisputed public record,”71 despite occasional 
disputes in patent cases regarding what happened during an 
examiner interview. 
Perhaps most astonishing was the remarkable assertion that 
“there should be no ‘ambiguity’ in claim language to one of 
ordinary skill in the art that would require resort to evidence 
outside the specification and prosecution history.”72 According to 
the Federal Circuit, compliance with the “particularly pointing out 
and distinctly claiming” requirement of § 112 of the patent 
statute73 precludes ambiguity: “[i]f the patent’s claims are 
sufficiently unambiguous for the PTO, there should exist no factual 
ambiguity when those same claims are later construed by a court of 
law in an infringement action.”74 This extraordinary declaration 
thus means, according to the Federal Circuit, that extrinsic 
evidence cannot be used “for the purpose of clarifying ambiguity 
in claim terminology.” Twenty years later, precisely that kind of 
ambiguity caused the Supreme Court to overturn Markman’s de 
novo review standard.75 Until then, courts and litigants struggled 
with how to explain obvious ambiguities in claim language that the 
                                                                                                             
70 Id. at 979 (quoting WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR 
USEFUL INVENTIONS § 733, at 483–84 (1890)). 
71 Id. at 980. That view did not originate with Markman, but has long been 
part of patent lore. See, e.g., Senmed, 888 F.2d at 819 n.8. 
72 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
73 35 U.S.C. § 112 (West 2014). 
74 Markman, 52 F.3d at 986. 
75 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836 (2015). The 
phrase “molecular weight” has three meanings: “peak average molecular 
weight,” “number average molecular weight,” and “weight average molecular 
weight”. 
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Federal Circuit said should not exist. 
 
B.  The Markman Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
 
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Markman provided a 
striking counterpoint to the reasoning of the majority. Although 
Judge Mayer’s concurrence agreed with the ultimate outcome76 
and Judge Newman’s dissent did not,77 they both excoriated the 
majority for its reliance on the fact–law distinction to remove 
juries from claim construction and for adopting the de novo review 
standard. In so doing, they identified the issues that would 
dominate Markman proceedings over the ensuing two decades. 
Judge Newman was particularly instructive. Although her opinions 
have been unjustly dismissed as misguided reveries, her dissent in 
Markman, along with Judge Mayer’s concurrence, provided a 
concise roadmap of the Federal Circuit struggles to come. 
The issues raised by Judges Mayer and Newman were legion: 
Factual issues exist regarding the prior art,78 and the “meaning . . . 
of an event during prosecution.”79 In resolving disputes over terms, 
“the trier of fact often makes findings that depend on the weight, 
credibility, and probative value of conflicting evidence . . . .”80 
And “the meaning and scope of disputed technologic and other 
terms or art in particular usage are classical questions of fact.”81 A 
court of appeals is not a trial court, because “[a]ppellate briefs and 
fifteen minutes per side of attorney argument are not designed for 
de novo findings of disputed technologic questions.”82 While claim 
interpretation is ultimately a question of law, underlying factual 
                                                                                                             
76 Markman, 52 F.3d at 998–99 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
77 Id. at 1026 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman would have 
remanded to the district court to apply the substantial evidence standard to 
review of the jury verdict. Id. 
78 Id. at 991 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
79 Id. at 991 (Mayer, J., concurring), 1004 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing 
Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 
1988)). 
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issues still exist.83 And most significantly, “[w]hen the extrinsic 
evidence is in conflict—as it invariably is—what then? Will the 
Federal Circuit itself weigh the evidence of expert witnesses?”84 
Each of these, and more, became the stuff of endless argument 
following Markman. 
Judges Mayer and Newman also anticipated the Markman 
hearing, a procedure without any counterpart in the rest of 
jurisprudence: “The majority’s elimination of . . . the deference 
owed to the judge . . . distorts the trial/appellate relationship in a 
manner unique to patent litigation . . . .”85 As Judge Mayer 
declared, Markman “represents a secession from the mainstream of 
law.”86 Nowhere else would parties fight for months over the 
eventual jury instructions, sometimes with evidentiary hearings, 
sometimes with expert reports, sometimes with depositions and 
other discovery. Markman transformed patent litigators into hyper 
specialists, devoting astonishing efforts to quibbles over both 
common and uncommon words, following ever-changing 
procedures in pursuit of the ever-elusive predictability and 
certainty. 
 
C.  The Supreme Court Affirmance 
 
After the sturm und drang at the Federal Circuit, the Supreme 
Court’s review was anticlimactic. In a short, unanimous opinion, 
the Supreme Court ruled that “the construction of a patent, 
including terms of art within its claims, is exclusively within the 
province of the court.”87 The Court side-stepped the fact–law issue. 
It concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show a practice 
analogous to claim interpretation was accomplished by juries 
before the adoption of the Constitution.88 It found no binding 
Supreme Court precedent requiring construction of patent claims 
                                                                                                             
83 Id. at 1000–02. 
84 Id. at 1006, 1008. 
85 Id. at 1008. 
86 Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
87 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
88 Id. at 377–83. 
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by juries, and then decided the case on policy grounds.89 Judges 
were better suited to the task of claim interpretation and were more 
likely to benefit the public by providing “uniformity in the 
treatment of a given patent.”90 The issue of de novo review was 
ignored, as were the Federal Circuit’s contortions of claim 
construction practice to preserve that review. Juries were out, 
judges would henceforth evaluate the meaning of claims, and the 
patent world embarked on a new, and uncertain, whirlwind of 
evolving semantic struggles. 
 
III. THE EARLY FALL-OUT FROM MARKMAN 
 
Like all dramatic changes in the law, Markman produced 
immediate questions about what to do and how to do it. Judges 
must construe the claims and instruct the jury on their meaning, 
that much was clear. But when? How? What evidence, if any, 
should be considered? What procedural rules should be followed? 
District courts and litigants struggled to answer these and many 
similar issues. And they learned, to their dismay, that despite their 
best efforts, the de novo review by the Federal Circuit rendered 
their decisions irrelevant and the ultimate outcome less predictable. 
Two immediate issues were faced: when should the district court 
construe the claims and what evidence should the court review? 
 
A.  Hearings and When to Hold Them 
 
After Markman, district courts had to decide the procedures for 
construing claims. No precedent existed, so district courts had to 
create the rules from scratch, adopting new procedures as they 
gained experience.91 Even fundamental questions such as whether 
the claims should be construed after a hearing or simply on written 
briefs had never been answered. District courts thus tried every 
                                                                                                             
89 Id. at 384–90. 
90 Id. at 390. 
91 District courts were quick to note that Markman “provided no procedural 
guidance for the nature of proceedings for a pretrial construction of claims.” 
Chad Indus., Inc. v. Automation Tooling Sys., Inc., 938 F. Supp. 601, 603 (C.D. 
Cal. 1996). 
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approach, and early Markman proceedings ranged from long 
evidentiary hearings, to attorney arguments, to written 
submissions. 
The most significant question soon became when to hold the 
hearings. Under Markman’s limited guidance, the claims could be 
construed any time before the jury began its deliberations: before 
discovery, during discovery but before expert reports, after expert 
reports, while deciding a summary judgment motion, at the pre-
trial conference, or during or even after trial.92 Defendants, often 
convinced that the case would disappear as soon as the claims were 
construed, sought claim construction at the earliest opportunity. 
Defendants saw no reason to engage in discovery and motion 
practice when, in their view, a simple determination of claim 
meaning would demonstrate non-infringement. But early Markman 
proceedings carry risks for judges, who care more for judicial 
efficiency than the preferences of litigants. Judges soon realized 
that early decisions carried a “whack-a-mole” risk,93 where 
resolution of the early claim construction issues led to other claim 
construction issues as the case became more refined. 
Claim construction proceedings held early usually occurred 
before the expert opinions were formed, which sometimes 
deprived the court of expert assistance in claim construction. And 
judges found that they were more comfortable with the case and its 
technology at later stages of the case, when the overall 
infringement and validity issues were refined. Judges experimented 
with claim construction at a variety of different times, and even 
today, the timing of Markman hearings varies widely from district 
to district and from judge to judge within each district.94 The 
                                                                                                             
92 E.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libby–Owens–Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 
844, 850 (D. Del. 1995). Construction after trial has the advantage of providing 
the judge all possible evidence, but posed its own problems, due to the delay 
required to construe the claims. See Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus. 
L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 332 n.3 (D. Del. 1995). 
93 “[O]nce you do claim construction, people start coming up with new 
theories and new approaches.” Delaware Bar Foundation, Patent Litigation in 
the District of Delaware: The Judge’s Perspective, 18 DEL. LAWYER 6, 7–8 
(2000) (comments by McKelvie, J.). 
94 E.g., id. (District of Delaware judges discussing their options for conduct 
of a Markman hearing). 
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adoption of local patent rules, starting with the Northern District of 
California, provided some uniformity within districts by putting 
normal claim construction after mandatory disclosure of 
infringement and validity contentions, but great variety still exists 
between districts, and judges are free, even in districts with local 
rules, to schedule the Markman hearing as late in the process as 
they desire. That variation encourages forum shopping as plaintiffs 
seek the most advantageous timing (usually later in the case), and 
the variety created great cost uncertainty, especially for defendants. 
 
B.  What Can the Court Review? 
 
The problem of when to conduct Markman hearings pales in 
comparison to the issues surrounding what evidence the district 
court can consider. The Federal Circuit’s guidance was less than 
Delphic, and the Supreme Court did nothing to resolve the 
uncertainty. Compounding the problem, the Federal Circuit’s 
proposition that no credibility determinations result from 
reviewing competing expert testimony produced immediate 
consternation among the judiciary.95 Expert testimony could be 
taken, and indeed, seemed necessary to understand some patents, 
but its proper weight was obscure. Use of non-patent documents to 
aid the process was equally uncertain. How was the prior art to be 
used, if at all? Were dictionaries, which were “extrinsic” to the 
patent and prosecution history, now to be disregarded, or merely 
given less weight? Should a technical treatise or a technical article 
be considered, and if so for what purpose? And if consulted, how 
much weight should be given? The inventor’s testimony was of 
little or no weight, according to Markman, but did that also apply 
to admissions by the inventor? In the world created by Markman, 
where incomprehensible patents nevertheless had “no ambiguity” 
and the extrinsic evidence “cannot be relied upon to change the 
meaning of the claims,” discerning the understanding of a person 
skilled in the art became a daunting prospect. 
                                                                                                             
95 E.g., Lucas Aerospace, 890 F. Supp. at 333 n.7 (Schwartz, J.) (“But when 
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals states that the trial court does not do 
something that the trial court does and must do to perform the judicial function, 
that court knowingly enters a land of sophistry and fiction.”). 
26
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 10, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss4/2
2015] MARKMAN TWENTY YEARS LATER: 275 
TWENTY YEARS OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
The Federal Circuit attempted to resolve these issues a year 
after Markman in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.96 Rather 
than clarifying the process, Vitronics created a mythical world that 
compounded the uncertainty. Intended to clarify the step-by-step 
process courts should use to construe claims, Vitronics instead 
presented district courts with a nearly insurmountable task: they 
must understand and construe eccentric jargon describing esoteric 
technology, while using experts to help them understand that 
technology but not the patent’s claims. 
Vitronics began by establishing a hierarchy. Patents are 
construed by first looking only at the intrinsic evidence. The 
process begins by looking at the word of the claims,97 which are to 
be given their “ordinary and customary meaning.”98 The 
specification is then reviewed, followed by the prosecution 
history.99 Then the Federal Circuit indulged in a fantasy. “In most 
situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve 
any ambiguity in a disputed claim term.”100 Perhaps this approach 
makes sense for patents involving simple technology, but the idea 
is absurd for much of the modern technology described in patents. 
One can rarely say that “disputed” terms have no ambiguity to a 
judge when those terms are used in patents involving complex 
chemistry, semiconductors, software, or any of a host of subtly 
complex subjects. Vitronics nevertheless declared such clarity the 
norm and proceeded to narrowly proscribe use of experts to 
explain the disputed terms, except in rare circumstances.101 
Assuredly, experts could be consulted.102 But such extrinsic 
evidence generally, and experts in particular, could normally be 
                                                                                                             
96 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
97 Id. at 1582. 
98 Id. Vitronics made no attempt to explain how the court was to divine the 
“ordinary and customary” meaning of technical terms that are outside the court’s 
normal understanding. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1583. 
101 The goal was to provide public notice so that competitors could “review 
the public record, apply the established rules of claim construction, ascertain the 
scope of the patentees claimed invention and, thus, design around the claimed 
invention.” Id. 
102 Id. at 1584. 
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consulted to only “help the court come to the proper understanding 
of the claims”—it could not be used “to vary or contradict the 
claim language.”103 How the judge was to know that the expert, 
describing medicinal chemistry, was contradicting the claim 
language was never described. Instead, the district courts were left 
to perform metaphysical gymnastics: they could let the expert 
explain the technology of the patent but not the words used in the 
patent to describe the technology.104 Experts could not be used to 
“vary claim terms” even from how they were “implicitly” defined 
in the specification.105 
Vitronics did provide some clarity. It explained that prior art 
could be considered as well as dictionaries.106 The importance of 
the specification was emphasized.107 Inventor testimony on claim 
meaning was again condemned.108 And the sequence of analysis 
was clearly identified. Yet the process was impossible for any 
technology unfamiliar to the judge, and the result was growing 
confusion. 
 
IV. DE NOVO REVIEW REVISITED 
 
Markman ruled that a district court’s claim construction 
decision would be reviewed de novo on appeal, based upon the 
contention that claim construction involved no fact issues. The 
Supreme Court avoided directly addressing the question, which 
appeared to leave the de novo review standard intact. Yet the 
Supreme Court’s decision hinted that claim interpretation was a 
mixed question of law and fact,109 thereby producing decisions by 
                                                                                                             
103 Id. 
104 Judge Rader subsequently commented that “[a]s a matter of logic, this 
instruction is difficult to grasp.” Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 
1474 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
105 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583–84. 
106 Id. at 1584. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 The Supreme Court in Markman hinted that claim construction was a 
“mongrel practice,” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 
(1996), and that it fell “somewhere between a pristine legal standard and simple 
historical fact,” id. at 388. 
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various Federal Circuit panels applying the “clearly erroneous” 
standard to factual aspects of claim interpretation.110 The issue then 
was addressed in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc.,111 two years after 
Vitronics, and three years after Markman. 
 
A.  Cybor 
 
Demonstrating the sharp division that would characterize 
Federal Circuit attempts to grapple with the Markman–Vitronics 
process, Cybor produced six opinions: an opinion by the majority 
joined by eight judges; separate concurring opinions by Judges 
Plager, Bryson, and Chief Judge Mayer; a dissent by Judge Rader; 
and additional views by Judge Newman.112 The Cybor majority re-
affirmed the de novo review standard, locking into place the 
foundation for much future angst. Rejecting the suggestion that the 
Supreme Court’s Markman decision supports claim construction as 
a legal issue with some underlying factual determinations,113 the 
Cybor majority resolutely declared that “nothing” from the 
Supreme Court’s decision supports the view “that claim 
construction may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of 
fact.”114 Compounding the difficulty, Cybor rejected the 
suggestion that “there should be deference to what are asserted to 
be factual underpinnings of claim construction,”115 a conclusion 
that was immediately undermined by Judge Plager’s view that 
“common sense dictates that the trial judge’s view will carry 
                                                                                                             
110 E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 
1547, 1555–56 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Wiener v. NEC Elecs. Inc., 102 F.3d 534, 539 
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Metaulics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
111 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 1455. 
114 Id. Ignoring entirely the concept of judicial restraint, the majority 
declared that the Supreme Court must have concluded that no factual issues arise 
in claim construction, else “surely the Supreme Court would have discussed 
whether subsidiary or underlying fact questions should be decided by the judge 
or the jury.” Id. at 1455 n.5. 
115 Id. at 1455–56. 
29
Riedinger: <i>Markman</i> Twenty Years Later: Twenty Years of Unintended Con
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2015
278 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 10:4 
weight.”116 Judge Bryson compounded the uncertainties by 
declaring that, when “claim construction would turn on an issue 
such as a credibility judgment between two competing expert 
witnesses,”117 de novo review still allows the appellate court “to 
factor into our legal analysis the district court’s superior access to 
one of the pertinent tools.”118 The battle lines were now drawn for 
a long struggle that would continue for the next seventeen years. 
Cybor also presaged the difficulties in finding “ordinary and 
customary” meaning in common terms, since Cybor raised a 
significant dispute over the meaning of the word “to,”119 and the 
phrase “or both.”120 When simple, not technical terms such as “to” 
and “or both” are the focus of district court and appellate 
argument, the entire concept of “plain meaning” or “ordinary 
meaning” becomes suspect. Yet that concept remains a bedrock of 
claim construction law, adding great uncertainty to how disputes 
over such terms will eventually be resolved. 
The Cybor majority was excoriated in Chief Judge Mayer’s 
concurrence, Judge Rader’s dissent, and Judge Newman’s 
additional views. Each focused on the difficulty of applying the de 
novo review standard under the Markman process. Chief Judge 
Mayer declared that the majority’s adherence to de novo review 
“profoundly misapprehends” the Supreme Court’s Markman 
decision.121 Judge Rader criticized the lack of deference to the trial 
“main event”122 and lamented the Federal Circuit’s inability to 
reconcile the denigration of expert testimony with the principle 
that claim meaning is viewed in the eyes of one of ordinary skill in 
the art with: “What then defeats the relevance of the testimony of 
one of skill in that art at the time of the invention?”123 He noted the 
high reversal rate appearing in Federal Circuit cases and declared 
that the Markman process “provides no early certainty at all, but 
                                                                                                             
116 Id. at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring). 
117 Id. at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 1458–59. “To” was also discussed in Chief Judge Mayer’s 
concurring opinion. Id. at 1469, 1472. 
120 Id. at 1469, 1472 (Mayer, C.J., concurring). 
121 Id. at 1463. 
122 Id. at 1473. 
123 Id. at 1475. 
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only opens the bidding.”124 Judge Newman agreed, noting the 
objective of “greater stability” thereby “enhancing consistency” 
“had not been well achieved.”125 She described the resulting 
“unpredictability”126 of Markman, and how the Federal Circuit 
process will “confound rather than ease the litigation process.”127 
All of these comments would be repeated over the decades, as the 
Federal Circuit continued to cling to de novo review in the face of 
ever increasing criticism. 
The issues of de novo review and deference to the district court 
would continue to dog the Federal Circuit, and the issue is alive 
even now. Those issues were debated but not resolved in 
Phillips,128 the 2005 decision that has dominated claim 
construction for the last decade. De novo review remained the law 
after Phillips, despite even more strident criticism.129 They were 
again the focus in 2014, when the Federal Circuit decided Lighting 
Ballast,130 and again reaffirmed de novo review.131 Only in 2015 
                                                                                                             
124 Id. at 1476. 
125 Id. at 1478 (Newman, J., additional views). 
126 Id. at 1479. 
127 Id. at 1480. 
128 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal 
Circuit invited amicus briefs on a number of claim construction issues, including 
whether “[it is] appropriate for this court to accord any deference to any aspect 
of trial court claim construction rulings.” Id. at 1328. The Federal Circuit 
majority opinion did not debate the question but instead merely embraced 
Vitronics. Id. 
129 Chief Judge Mayer’s criticism of the majority was scathing. He referred 
to the “absurdity” of “adhering to the falsehood that claim construction is devoid 
of any factual component.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330. He described the result of 
the Federal Circuit’s standard as “mayhem” that “seriously undermined the 
legitimacy of the process, if not the integrity of the institution.” Id. He described 
the Federal Circuit’s claim construction decisions as a “black hole,” id., and said 
“the court flails about in an attempt to solve the claim construction 
‘conundrum.’” Id. at 1334. His conclusion was disdainful: “The court’s opinion 
today is akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic—the orchestra is 
playing as if nothing is amiss, but the ship is still heading for Davey Jones’ 
locker.” Id. at 1334–35. 
130 Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 
1272, 1282–84 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reaffirming the de novo review standard, this 
time on the basis of stare decisis so that “settled expectations” should not be 
disrupted). 
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did the Supreme Court finally correct the Federal Circuit and direct 
what should have been plain all along: claim construction has 
factual components that must be reviewed under Rule 52’s “clear 
error” standard.132 In the meantime, much damage was done, and 
the Federal Circuit suffered continuing disdain for its stubborn 
assertion of the impossible. 
 
B.  The Reversal Rate: Growing Criticism 
 
Markman was decided in the hope that claim construction 
conducted solely by judges would make patent law more certain 
and predictable. Alas, that was not to be, as the reversal rates by 
the Federal Circuit began to demonstrate.133 Criticism of the 
Federal Circuit’s rate of reversal became a continuing feature of 
the Federal Circuit’s Markman jurisprudence.134 The criticism, 
from judges, practitioners, and scholars, attacked Federal Circuit 
jurisprudence as confusing and often attributed that confusion to 
the de novo review standard. Thus, for example, the National Law 
Journal describes the reversal rate of claim construction as having 
“so enraged the bench that one federal judge—Samuel Kent of 
Galveston, Texas—has dismissed the appeals court as ‘little green 
men wearing propeller hats who don’t know Tuesday from 
Philadelphia.’”135 
A careful study of the reversal rate on claim construction136 
revealed that reversal was indeed a problem, despite occasional 
                                                                                                             
131 Id. 
132 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 833 (2015). 
133 As early as 1998, Judge Rader noted in Cybor that fifty-three percent of 
patent cases were reversed by the Federal Circuit, in whole or in part. Cybor 
Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
134 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim 
Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 245–46 
(2005). The author, who would eventually be appointed to the Federal Circuit, 
concluded that Markman created confusion and the reversal rate was getting 
worse. 
135 Victoria Slind-Flor, Formerly Obscure Court is in Spotlight: Importance 
of New Technology Makes Its Decisions Big News, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 30, 2001 at 
B9, B12. 
136  Moore, supra note 134. 
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denials by Federal Circuit judges. Conducted by Professor Moore 
(later Federal Circuit Judge Moore), the study concluded that the 
claim construction reversal rate in appeals from 1996 through 2003 
was 34.5%.137 Professor Moore further concluded that, after 
declining from 1996 through 1998 to 20%, the reversal rate 
increased to nearly 40% by 2003.138 From this, Professor Moore 
blamed de novo review for at least part of the increase, and 
concluded that “district court judges are not able to resolve claim 
construction issues as the Federal Circuit judges would like.”139 
Others reached similar conclusions.140 
Professor Moore also concluded that the Federal Circuit “is not 
providing sufficient guidance on claim construction,”141 a view 
that echoed the more vigorous criticism from the bar and other 
scholars. Thus, for example, the Chair of the ABA Section of 
Intellectual Property Law criticized the Federal Circuit’s “morass 
of confused and contradictory claim construction canons.”142 A 
practitioner stated “what is certain is that uncertainty reigns 
supreme in trying to prognosticate how the CAFC will resolve” 
issues.143 Another commented that “[i]t comes as little surprise that 
some trial judges have grown apathetic to the process, and that 
nearly all litigants unhappy with the outcome of their cases will 
                                                                                                             
137 Id. at 233. 
138 Id. at 246. 
139 Id. 
140 E.g., Michael A. O’Shea, A Changing Role for the Markman Hearing: 
In Light of Festo IX, Markman Hearings Could Become M-F-G Hearings Which 
are Longer, More Complex and Ripe for Appeal, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 843 
(2004); Victoria Slind-Flor, Markman Precedent Holds Up Patents: Ruling 
Intended to Add Predictability and Speed Fails to Do So, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 15, 
2001 at A1, A12. 
141 Moore, supra note 139, at 247. 
142 Mark T. Banner, Keeping Current with the Chair, 21 ABA SEC. OF 




143 George J. Awad & George A. Frank, Federal Circuit Construction 
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appeal and include a claim construction issue.”144 Still another 
criticized Federal Circuit “hyperactivity,” and argued that the 
Federal Circuit was engaged in “appellate fact finding.”145 
Something had definitively gone amiss in the Federal Circuit’s 
plan to produce greater predictability and clarity. 
 
V. NEVER-ENDING PROBLEMS 
 
The problem of de novo review dominated issues after 
Markman, but it was by no means the only issue to arise. When 
claim construction was removed from the jury’s black box and 
subjected to scrutiny in the harsh light of written judicial opinions, 
the carefully constructed procedure of Markman, Vitronics, Cybor, 
and Phillips displayed numerous intractable flaws. Some flaws 
were a necessary result from Markman, while others followed from 
the inability of the Federal Circuit to articulate coherent or 
practical claim construction rules. Some were eventually resolved 
by the Federal Circuit, and some remain even today. 
 
A.  Whack-a-Mole: The Unforeseen Problem of Iterative Processes 
 
A little understood aspect of Markman produced a crucial but 
rarely recognized problem. Claim construction is inherently an 
iterative process, involving not just the intrinsic and extrinsic 
evidence but complex interactions between the plaintiff’s theory of 
infringement and the defendant’s theory of invalidity. Defendants 
select their prior art based in part on their objective view of the 
patent’s proper scope, but also based upon the scope of the patent 
implied by the plaintiff’s infringement contentions; broader 
contentions capture more prior art, and the canons of claim 
construction declare that the prior art helps inform the meaning of 
                                                                                                             
144 Anthony R. Zeuli & Rachel Clark Hugley, Avoiding Patent Claim 
Construction Errors: Determining the Ordinary and Customary Meaning Before 
Reading the Written Description, FED. LAWYER, June 2004, at 29–30, available 
at http://www.merchantgould.com/portalresource/1262.pdf. 
145 William C. Rooklidge & Mathew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The 
Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
725, 729–30 (2000). 
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the claim terms.146 The natural result is that a change in the 
plaintiff’s infringement theory (and accordingly the plaintiff’s 
claim construction theory) produces a change in the defendant’s 
claim construction arguments. Similarly, when the defendant 
identifies prior art, the plaintiff inevitably seeks to modify its claim 
construction to avoid the prior art but still cover the accused 
product. Plaintiffs and defendants both frequently fail to fully 
understand how their opponent is truly characterizing claim terms 
until the process has progressed, and often not until after extensive 
briefing. The result is a series of iterations, with the parties 
repeatedly jostling as their opponent’s assertions are clarified and 
modified. This iterative process is integrally part of claim 
interpretation. 
The problem becomes more acute when, as is usually the case, 
the district court construes the terms by accepting part of each 
side’s argument. The parties then scramble to adjust their 
contentions. The defendant searches for new art covered by the 
unforeseen interpretation of the court, setting off a counter 
argument by the plaintiff, who looks to change other aspects of the 
claim interpretation to make the new construction consistent with 
the plaintiff’s infringement theory. When extrinsic evidence is 
involved (as is frequently the case), the parties need to revisit their 
extrinsic discovery. This is the “whack-a-mole” problem, first 
described by Judge McKelvie of the District of Delaware,147 and 
later detailed by Judge Rader in his Cybor dissent.148 Worse, 
district judges sometimes do not recognize the implications of their 
construction until they hear trial arguments and testimony, at 
which point they might need to change the construction mid-trial, 
                                                                                                             
146 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
147 Delaware Bar Foundation, supra note 93. 
148 “As soon as the trial court issues a claim interpretation, both sides often 
seek to shift their original claim interpretations to accommodate the judge’s 
views. Thus, the parties seek to revise expert reports or reopen discovery to 
account for the Judge’s interpretation. . . . As a result of the new and perhaps 
somewhat unexpected interpretation, the parties scramble to create and acquire 
new evidence for their infringement arguments.” Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1474 n.2. 
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with potentially unfortunate consequences.149 
The problem did not exist before Markman. When juries 
construed the claims as part of their infringement analysis, they did 
so in a single proceeding (the trial). Each side presented a coherent 
theory. The plaintiff described how their theory of infringement, 
including their theory of how the claim terms were interpreted, 
both demonstrated infringement and preserved the patent’s 
validity. Defendants likewise presented an internally consistent 
theory explaining how the correct interpretation of the patent 
showed either non-infringement or invalidity (or perhaps both). 
Some iterations occurred during the give-and-take at trial, but all 
interwoven issues were hashed out in the all-encompassing 
discussions in the jury room, which led to a decision that one side 
was right and the other wrong. 
Temporally distancing the first step of the infringement 
analysis (claim interpretation) from both the second step 
(comparison of the claims to the accused product) and the validity 
analysis necessarily produced an overwhelming demand for further 
iterations. Markman led to endless battles that consisted of 
attempts by the plaintiff to maintain infringement theory flexibility 
throughout the process and matching attempts by the defendant to 
lock the plaintiff into an early and unchanging construction. 
Plaintiffs similarly sought to prevent any shifts of the defendant’s 
invalidity theories, especially after the trial court construed the 
claims. Some local rules accommodated this jostling, but some did 
not, and in districts without local rules, the judge allowed, or 
disallowed, modifications as she saw fit. 
No refinement of the Markman process can eliminate this 
problem. As long as claim construction occurs before the jury is 
presented with the trial evidence, parties will seek to modify the 
construction wherever they see an advantage. The result will 
continue to be a disagreeable sausage-making process, with at least 
occasional unfairness for one side or the other. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
149 Id. 
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B.  Semantic Antics: The Issues Become Surreal 
 
Although well-intentioned, the Federal Circuit’s efforts to 
delineate rational and consistent claim construction rules led to 
perplexing contortions and, occasionally, bewildering results. 
Underlying the difficulty was the Federal Circuit’s desire for an 
almost algorithmic process, where the same input (a patent claim) 
would produce the same result (a correct claim construction) 
regardless of who applied the algorithm.150 Since a consistently 
applied algorithm is impossible, the Federal Circuit decisions 
repeatedly disappointed. This a natural result of the Federal 
Circuit’s concentration on the meaning of words, which contrasts 
sharply with the pre-Federal Circuit approach to claim 
construction. That approach focused not on word interpretation, 
but on a determination of what the inventor actually invented.151 
The latter approach tacitly recognized that the same invention 
could be described by different words, but justice would be served 
by confining the patent to the actual invention, however described. 
This approach was rejected by the Federal Circuit, which was 
enthralled in its quest for the Holy Grail of predictability. The 
Federal Circuit was forced to grapple with endless semantic 




If claim construction involves determining the meaning of the 
words used in the patent claim, then a natural resource to aid that 
process is a dictionary, technical or otherwise. Though this 
position is manifestly logical, the Federal Circuit still struggled to 
determine when—or even if—dictionaries could be used to help 
                                                                                                             
150 The Federal Circuit disavowed the existence of any algorithm in 
Phillips, saying that “there is no magic formula or catechism” and that it “did 
not attempt to provide a rigid algorithm for claim construction . . . .” Phillips v. 
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Yet the Federal Circuit’s 
goal of predictability and certainty has no other implication. 
151 E.g., Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 14 (1935) (“If the claim were fairly 
susceptible of two constructions, that should be adopted which will secure to the 
patentee his actual invention.” (emphasis added)). 
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construe the claims. Part of the struggle stemmed from the Federal 
Circuit’s reasonable desire to ensure that the patent’s specification 
was the primary claim construction tool, but part also flowed from 
the Federal Circuit’s unceasing hunger to protect the rationale of 
Markman, so that extrinsic evidence (which most specifically 
included dictionaries) could not crack the edifice built from the “no 
issue of fact” gospel. 
Before Markman, dictionaries were a consistent source used in 
claim construction issues, including in the regional circuits, in the 
C.C.P.A., and in the Federal Circuit.152 The practice continued 
after Markman, with the Federal Circuit repeatedly using, and 
approving, use of dictionaries.153 Dictionaries, after all, provided a 
route to determine the “ordinary and customary” meaning of terms. 
Yet dictionaries often provided multiple meanings for words, and 
general dictionaries rarely defined words as they were used in 
esoteric technologies. Since claim construction had become a 
semantic jungle, focused upon ever more subtle distinctions in the 
“plain and ordinary” meaning154 of words, several Federal Court 
decisions warned of the dangers posed by dictionaries.155 When the 
                                                                                                             
152 Cases from the regional circuits include: Saunders v. Air-Flo Co., 646 
F.2d 1201, 1206 (7th Cir. 1981); Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294, 
1297 (6th Cir. 1975); Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
489 F.2d 1105, 1110 (6th Cir. 1973). C.C.P.A. cases include: In re Gaubert, 524 
F.2d 1222, 1226 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Skoll, 523 F.2d 1392, 1395–96 
(C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Altenpohl, 500 F.2d 1151, 1157 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
Federal Circuit cases include: Nike, Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d 
644, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 46 F.3d 
1556, 1561 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 
948, 951 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
153 E.g., Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brusnwick Corp., 288 F.3d. 1359, 1366 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002); Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1334–35 
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
154 E.g., GE Lighting Solutions, LLC. v. Agilight, Inc., 750 F.3d 
1304,1308–10 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
155 Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(holding that dictionaries are inappropriate for common words that might be 
used differently in the patent); AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co. 239 F.3d 
1239, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that dictionaries should only be used when 
the patent fails to define a term); Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 
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Texas Digital156 case expressed resounding support for dictionary 
use,157 the resulting controversy prompted the Federal Circuit to 
consider, en banc, just how dictionaries could be used to help 
determine the meaning of terms.158 The result was an elaborate 
discussion in Phillips, approving particular technical dictionary 
uses, approving fewer uses of general dictionaries, slotting 
dictionaries into the elaborate claim construction hierarchy of 
Vitronics, and limiting the broad language of Texas Digital.159 Yet 
the dictionary guidance of Phillips was generalized, giving district 
courts ample opportunity to inadvertently misuse dictionaries and 
thereby justify yet another ground for reversal in a Federal Circuit 
de novo review. 
 
2. Nonsensical Decisions 
 
Achieving a fair and just resolution of legal disputes would 
seem a fundamental goal of the courts, even in patent cases. A 
priori, admittedly “nonsensical” decisions should be abhorred by 
all courts and avoided whenever possible. Yet the Federal Circuit, 
driven by a need to follow its Markman and Vitronics dictates, has 
ruled that “nonsensical” conclusions must be accepted when the 
Court’s claim construction process leads to that end. Thus, the 
process is all-important, and deviations cannot be accepted merely 
to avoid a nonsensical result. 
The leading case adopting this proposition is Chef America, 
Inc. v. Lamb–Weston, Inc.,160 which involved making bread. The 
claim specified heating the bread dough “to” a temperature of 
                                                                                                             
F.3d 1295, 1299–300 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that general dictionaries are 
unsuited to scientific meaning of words); Anderson v. Int’l Eng’g & Mfg., Inc., 
160 F.3d 1345, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that, where dictionaries 
provide more than one meaning, the technical meaning must be taken from the 
context of the patent). 
156 Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
157 Id. at 1202–05. 
158 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319–22 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
159 Id. 
160 Chef America, Inc., v. Lamb–Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
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400°F to 850°F.161 Yet if heated to that range, as every bread chef 
instinctively knew, the dough “would be burned to a crisp.”162 The 
patent owner argued that the claim obviously meant heating the 
dough “at” the specified temperature, which was the only logical 
interpretation of the claim.163 The district court refused to so 
construe the patent, concluding instead that a nonsensical result 
was required.164 The Federal Circuit agreed,165 conclusively 
demonstrating that the process was more important than reaching a 
result that made sense.166 
Chef America was not the first decision adopting a 
“nonsensical” result. The “nonsensical” doctrine originated five 
years earlier, in Process Control Corp. v. Hydreclaim Corp.167 
Like Chef America, the Process Control decision approved a 
“nonsensical” result, this time reversing a district court that had 
refused to do so.168 Process Control, however, involved a 
miswritten claim that used the same language for different 
processes in the specification.169 The Federal Circuit invalidated 
the claim rather than interpreting it to cover the process in the 
specification,170 thereby creating the principle applied in Chef 
America. While the principle’s application in Process Control was 
less unreasonable, the Federal Circuit nevertheless repeatedly 
applied it, not only in Chef America but in a series of subsequent 
cases.171 Yet those cases stand in sharp contrast to other decisions, 
                                                                                                             
161 Id. at 1371. 
162 Id. at 1373. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 1374–76. 
166 The Federal Circuit also refused to accept the conclusion of an expert’s 
declaration that the patent’s text should be read “as meaning that the product is 
placed in an oven whose temperature has been set in the range of about 400°F to 
850°F.” Id. at 1375. The expert explained that “[i]t was well known in 1987, and 
still is well known, that raising the temperature of a dough product itself to such 
high temperatures would result in an unusable product.” Id. The Federal Circuit 
was unmoved. 
167 190 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
168 Id. at 1355. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 1359. 
171 E.g., Source Vagabond Sys. Ltd. v Hydrapak, Inc., 753 F.3d 1291, 1301 
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such as AIA Engineering Ltd., where the Federal Circuit declared 
that “[w]e strive, where possible, to avoid nonsensical results in 
construing claim language.”172 In AIA, the Federal Circuit refused 
to give a claim term its ordinary meaning because it would be 
nonsensical.173 The rule, then, is that the Federal Circuit will avoid 
nonsensical claim constructions, except when nonsensical 
constructions will be applied.174 
 
3. “Plain and Ordinary” Meaning 
 
Vitronics held that “words in a claim are generally given their 
ordinary and customary meaning,”175 and Phillips explained that 
the “ordinary and customary” meaning was “the meaning that the 
term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question 
. . . .”176 Determining what is “ordinary” or “customary” has not, 
however, been a simple task. Phillips described how the “ordinary” 
meaning “may be readily apparent even to lay judges,”177 and in 
those circumstances “general purpose dictionaries may be helpful.” 
178 Yet in many cases, “determining the ordinary and customary 
meaning of a claim requires examination of terms that have a 
                                                                                                             
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Novel Labs., Inc., 749 F.3d 1349, 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 
1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
172 AIA Eng’g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l S/A, 657 F.3d 1264, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). Accord Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP, 616 
F.3d 1249, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. 
BENQ Am. Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
173 AIA Eng’g Ltd., 657 F.3d at 1276. 
174 The “nonsensical” cases are akin to the decision in Elekta Instr. S.A. v. 
O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, 214 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Vitronics had ruled that 
claim interpretations that exclude the preferred embodiment are “rarely, if ever 
correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.” 90 F.3d at 
1583. Yet in Elekta, the Federal Circuit chose the “ordinary meaning” of the 
claims terms to construe the patent to not cover the only embodiment disclosed 
in the specification. 214 F.3d at 1307–08. 
175 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
176 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
177 Id. at 1314. 
178 Id. 
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particular meaning in a field of art.”179 And therein lies the rub. 
Despite the exhaustive efforts of the Federal Circuit to provide 
user-friendly rules for claim construction, litigants repeatedly, and 
sometimes sharply, dispute just what is the “ordinary and 
customary” meaning of claim terms. 
Part of the difficulty arose from the evolution of the doctrine of 
“ordinary and customary” meaning into a doctrine of “plain and 
ordinary” meaning. “Ordinary” and “customary” are related terms, 
with “ordinary” implying that the meaning is common and not 
unusual, and “customary” implying that a meaning has some 
frequency of use. But “plain” is an entirely different concept, 
implying that the word’s meaning can be readily determined from 
the mere inspection of the term. Many “ordinary” terms are not at 
all “plain.” Yet the Federal Circuit has used both approaches, with 
little guidance on when a claim term’s meaning is “plain” rather 
than just “ordinary” or “customary.”180 Thus, while the concept of 
an “ordinary” meaning predates Markman,181 loose use of 
terminology caused the eventual adoption of a “plain and ordinary” 
meaning standard, which is in common use today.182 Although the 
concepts have different meanings, the Federal Circuit has not 
explained when the “plain” meaning is apparent and should be 
used, rather than a term’s “ordinary” meaning, leaving district 
courts and litigants to follow the loose “dictionary” guidance of 
Phillips. Not surprisingly, plaintiffs have cleaved to the “plain” 
meaning approach—it allows them to argue any quasi-reasonable 
meaning for disputed terms, thereby providing them the flexibility 
they so dearly value. The Federal Circuit has criticized mere 
                                                                                                             
179 Id. 
180 The sloppiness may have resulted from a belief that an “ordinary and 
customary” meaning does not differ from a “plain and ordinary” meaning. For 
example, Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 215 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 
2000), applied the “plain and ordinary” meaning standard, but cited a case that 
actually described the “ordinary and customary” standard. Id. at 1291 (citing 
Johnson Worldwide Assoc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
181 E.g., Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 
182 E.g., Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 774 F.3d 1349, 1353 (2014). The 
shift in terminology appears in National Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic 
Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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adoption of “plain meaning”183 without explaining that meaning, 
so litigators, especially plaintiffs, continue to propose deciding that 
a term has a “plain meaning” that needs no further construction. 
 
4. It Depends on the Meaning of “Or” 
 
No demonstration of the impossibility of a predictable claim 
construction process, especially for terms that should have a “plain 
meaning,” is more vivid than in the two cases where the Federal 
Circuit was unable to agree on the meaning of the word “or.”184 In 
both cases, infringement turned on whether “or” should be 
interpreted exclusively (i.e., “A or B” but not “A and B”) or non-
exclusively (“A or B” or “A and B”). In both cases, the majority 
ruled in favor of the exclusive “or,” saying it was the “plain 
reading” of the claim185 or “quite clear” from the patent 
documents.186 The dissent contended that “or” should be construed 
non-exclusively, saying that was the “practical common-sense 
way” of writing the claim,187 and that the “plain meaning” of “or” 
could be either construction.188 The Markman–Vitronics process 
cannot produce predictable results when the patent experts at the 
Federal Circuit, in attempting to follow that process, cannot agree 
on the meaning of even the most commonly used and simplest of 
English terms. The “or” cases show the fallacy of attempts to rely 
on either “plain” or “ordinary” meaning as interpreted by judicial 
experts. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the somewhat less 
striking Federal Circuit decisions contesting the meaning of “on,” 
                                                                                                             
183 O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A determination that a claim term ‘needs no 
construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate when a 
term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on a term’s 
‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.”). 
184 Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Kustom Signals, Inc. v. 
Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
185 Brown, 265 F.3d at 1352. 
186 Kustom, 264 F.3d at 1331. 
187 Brown, 265 F.3d at 1354. 
188 Kustom, 264 F.3d at 1333. 
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Senmed, Inc. v. Richard–Allan Medical Indus., Inc.189 and 
Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co.190 
The Federal Circuit struggled with that simple term both before 
and after Markman. In Senmed, the issue was whether “on” 
required physical touching.191 The majority ruled that it did,192 and 
the dissent argued that it need not.193 In Inverness, the issue was 
whether “on” meant “on top of” a “test strip,” or whether “on” 
could include being interior to the strip, such that it was “on” just a 
portion of the strip.194 The district court ruled that “on” meant on 
top of,195 but the Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that the “plain 
meaning” of “on” included “within.”196 Again, these cases 
demonstrate that a term’s “plain meaning” can be anything but 
plain, and is usually dependent on the eye of the beholder. 
 
VI. OTHER ISSUES 
 
Much of consequence resulted from Markman that cannot be 
attributed to the Federal Circuit’s quixotic devotion to de novo 
review. And while the most significant cases produced 
consternation, confusion, and even conflict, other significant 
changes occurred, some for the good and others less so. 
 
A.  Phillips 
 
The 2005 decision in Phillips addressed a host of topics in an 
attempt to resolve disputes within the Federal Circuit and address 
the growing criticism of the Markman–Vitronics regimen.197 While 
                                                                                                             
189 888 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
190 309 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
191 Senmed, 888 F.2d at 821. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 824. 
194 Inverness Med. Switz., 309 F.3d at 1377–78. 
195 Id. at 1378. 
196 Id. at 1382. 
197 The Federal Circuit reheard the case en banc “to resolve issues 
concerning the construction of patent claims” that the original panel had raised. 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Seven claim 
construction topics were selected for resolution. Id. at 1383. 
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Phillips was criticized for failing to resolve the question of 
deference to the trial court rulings, it did clarify some unresolved 
issues. Its extensive discussion of dictionaries firmly established 
that dictionaries could be consulted,198 and it expressed a 
preference for technical over general dictionaries.199 If the 
remainder of Phillips’s discussion of dictionaries was less than 
fully edifying, the decision nevertheless eliminated one uncertainty 
for district courts and litigants. Phillips also reaffirmed that 
“claims should be so construed, if possible, to sustain their 
validity,”200 but did not endorse “a regime in which validity 
analysis is a regular component of claim construction.”201 Instead, 
preserving validity should be considered when the claim is still 
ambiguous “after applying all the available tools of claim 
construction.”202 
Phillips also confirmed that some of the basic principles of 
Vitronics would not be disturbed, thereby ending some of the 
clamor for revision. The primacy of the specification was 
cemented into claim construction law, with Phillips declaring that 
courts can “rely heavily on the written description for guidance as 
to the meaning of the claims.”203 Expert testimony was again 
endorsed, but again for a difficult-to-follow role: “to ensure that 
the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is 
consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish 
that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular 
meaning in the pertinent field.”204 The door was therefore open for 
extensive use of experts, but not for “conclusory, unsupported 
assertions.”205 Instead, Phillips concluded that “a court should 
discount any expert testimony ‘that is clearly at odds with the 
claim construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written 
description, and the prosecution history . . . .’”206 This process 
                                                                                                             
198 Id. at 1317–21. 
199 Id. at 1321. 
200 Id. at 1327. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 1317. 
204 Id. at 1318. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. (quoting Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. 
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essentially gave district courts license to listen to any and all expert 
testimony, as long as their claim construction opinion properly 
focused on the specification and prosecution history and did not 
improperly credit experts. 
Recognizing reality, Phillips conceded that “there is no magic 
formula or catechism for conducting claim construction.”207 That 
recognition relieved district courts of the concern that a reversal 
would result merely from following the wrong sequence of steps or 
holding the wrong kind of hearing. Moreover, Phillips underscored 
the “cardinal sin” of patent law, “reading a limitation from the 
written description into the claims,”208 again emphasizing the 
primacy of the “ordinary and customary meanings attributed to the 
words themselves.”209 The natural tension between reading a 
limitation from the specification into the claims and paying 
primary attention to the context of terms in the specification was, 
sadly, not resolved. Despite the remaining uncertainties, Phillips 
provided sufficient guidance that it became the bedrock of all 
subsequent claim interpretation cases; it provided enough clarity 
for judges and litigants to become comfortable with the resulting 
process, even while the ultimate outcome of claim construction 
remained unpredictable. 
 
B.  Preferring Narrow Interpretations 
 
An important claim construction doctrine developed separate 
from the Vitronics–Phillips line of cases, one that evidenced a 
distinctly pro-defendant bias. In Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. 
Prince Mfg., Inc.,210 the Federal Circuit announced a preference for 
narrow, rather than broad claim constructions.211 Athletic 
Alternatives addressed a circumstance where an “equal choice” 
                                                                                                             
Cir. 1998)). 
207 Id. at 1324. 
208 Id. at 1320 (quoting SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular 
Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
209 Id. (quoting Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 
1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
210 73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
211 Id. at 1581. 
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existed between a narrower and broader meaning of a claim. To 
resolve the question, the Federal Circuit announced a preference 
for the narrower interpretation.212 Its reasoning was peculiar: 
patents must provide “fair notice” of their scope, and the Federal 
Circuit declared “the notice function of the claim to be best served 
by adopting the narrower meaning.”213 Yet as a matter of logic, the 
notice function is served merely by having a rule that resolves the 
ambiguity flowing from equally valid constructions. That 
ambiguity would have been similarly resolved by choosing the 
broader interpretation. Nothing in Athletic Alternatives explained 
just why narrower interpretations provide inherently greater notice 
than broad interpretations. Nor did the Federal Circuit explain how 
its policy decision to favor narrow patents was consistent with 
encouraging innovation, which, after all, is the fundamental 
purpose of the patent system. One can easily argue that a policy 
favoring narrow patents reduces the rewards to inventors and 
thereby discourages innovation. The Federal Circuit nevertheless 
selected narrow interpretations.214 
 
C.  Knowledge of the Accused Device 
 
Pre-Markman cases sometimes took the logical but impractical 
position that claims were to be construed “without reference to the 
accused device.”215 That approach was a relic of the view that an 
objective interpretation of a patent would best be made without 
knowing the kind of structure sought to be covered by the patent. 
Other pre-Markman cases accepted reality, holding that claims are 
“construed independent of the accused product,” but that “the 
                                                                                                             
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 A related philosophy regarding the doctrine of equivalents was 
expressed in Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 
1977), where the Federal Circuit considered an attempt to use the doctrine of 
equivalents to cover a “foreseeable” problem in the claim language. The Federal 
Circuit declared that “it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to 
seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.” Id. at 
1425. 
215 E.g., SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 
1985). 
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particular accused product (or process) is kept in mind, for it is 
efficient to focus on the construction of only disputed elements or 
limitations in the claims.”216 After Markman, the Federal Circuit 
recognized that constructions that were devoid of knowledge of the 
infringement issues might not address the actual dispute. This, of 
course, would produce the inefficient “whack-a-mole” process that 
required a subsequent revisit of claim construction issues that trial 
courts believed were resolved. The Federal Circuit eliminated all 
uncertainty by expressly accepting that the trial court could 
consider the accused product, and indeed, can be helped by that 
evaluation.217 The result improved claim constructions by 
sharpening the trial court’s focus and reducing the need for 
constructions to be revisited. 
 
VII. DISTRICT COURT REACTIONS 
 
Claim construction at the district court level was impacted at 
least as much by district court reactions to Markman and its 
progeny as the Federal Circuit decisions. As soon as district courts 
recognized that patent cases imposed the additional burden of a 
separate hearing to evaluate patent claims, individual judges and 
districts began to react and modify their practices accordingly. 
 
A.  Local Patent Rules 
 
The first and most significant district court reaction to 
Markman was the adoption of local rules that would regularize the 
steps leading to Markman. Beginning with Northern California218 
(a district with a penchant for lengthy and complicated rules for 
every aspect of litigation), local patent rules began to dominate. 
Such rules normally mandate initial disclosures identifying the 
                                                                                                             
216 Scripps Clinic & Res. Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 
(Fed. Cir. 1991). 
217 E.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 
1322, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pall Corp. v. Hemasure, Inc., 181 F.3d 1305, 
1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
218 Patent Local Rules, U.S. DIST. COURT, N. DIST. CAL., 
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/localrules/patent (last updated Nov. 1, 2014). 
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accused product or process and describing the plaintiff’s theory of 
infringement, followed by an identification of the defendant’s 
invalidity contentions. The process next includes identification of 
disputed claim terms and exchange of the parties’ proposed 
constructions, followed by briefing to the district court. The 
practice is cumbersome and, at least in some cases, more involved 
than is necessary, adding to the complexity and cost of even the 
simplest patent case. 
District court judges nevertheless welcomed such rules because 
they freed individual judges from having to decide which 
procedure was most appropriate for each case.219 Defendants liked 
local rules because they mandated early disclosure of infringement 
theories that previously might have been obtained only after 
lengthy discovery battles. Plaintiffs with weak cases liked the rules 
because the burden on defendants, merely to get a claim 
interpretation, often encouraged early nuisance settlements. 
Defense lawyers loved the rules because the need for early 
invalidity contentions guaranteed extensive work before any 
substantive ruling in the case. Eventually, twenty-eight districts 
adopted local patent rules, including all major commercial 
jurisdictions (with the notable exception of the District of 
Delaware).220 Squabbles over the sufficiency of infringement 
contentions then became the norm, along with massive invalidity 
contentions. Motions to strike infringement and invalidity 
contentions became the norm, and legions of patent litigators 
became specialists in just the claim construction procedures of 
popular patent districts, such as the Eastern District of Texas and 
the Northern District of California. 
 
                                                                                                             
219 The most common justification was “[l]ocal patent rules seek to advance 
the orderly progression of patent litigation by requiring the parties ‘to crystallize 
their theories of the case early in the litigation and to adhere to those theories 
once they have been disclosed.’” Copper Innovations Group, LLC v. Nintendo 
Co., No. 2:07CV1752, 2012 WL 628465, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2012) 
(quoting Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., No. C 95-1987 FMS, 1998 
WL 775115, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1998)). 
220 The local patent rules across the country are gathered at 
http://www.localpatentrules.com. 
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B.  The Obligation to Construe, and Limits on the Number of 
Terms 
 
Despite the local rules, district court judges quickly came to 
realize that claim construction was a difficult and time-consuming 
process, as even the simplest technology produced wrangling over 
competing definitions of both common and uncommon words. 
Most patent cases do not settle before claim construction, so most 
cases require a hearing and a difficult opinion. Trial judges 
naturally sought ways to limit the portion of their valuable 
resources that were devoted to patent cases, and accordingly began 
setting limits on the number of terms they were willing to construe, 
either by saying that claim terms have their “plain meaning” or by 
setting a limit on the number of terms to be construed and leaving 
the parties to choose the most important terms. The result was O2 
Micro, which ruled that “[w]hen the parties present a fundamental 
dispute regarding the scope of a claim term, it is the court’s duty to 
resolve it.”221 Realism also prevailed, because the Federal Circuit 
also recognized that “district courts are not (and should not be) 
required to construe every limitation present in a patent’s asserted 
claims.”222 Trial courts now regularly limit the parties to ten or 
fifteen claim terms in any Markman proceeding. Since many cases 
involve disputes over many more terms, the result has been a 
partial return to the pre-Markman days, with the jury presented 
with trial arguments, and even trial expert testimony, on the 
meaning of contested claim terms.223 
 
                                                                                                             
221 O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
222 Id. 
223 In O2 Micro, the district court ruled that the term “only if” needed no 
construction, id. at 1361, so “the district court left the jury free to consider” the 
parties’ arguments. Id. at 1362. The plaintiff then “presented expert testimony to 
support its argument” on the meaning of “only if.” Id. While the Federal Circuit 
reversed in O2 Micro, id. at 1366, claim interpretation arguments before juries 
are the natural result of limits on the quantity of terms for construction. Of 
course, even under Markman some form of claim interpretation has always been 
presented to juries, when the litigants argue their differing interpretations of the 
claim constructions, especially in closing argument. 
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VIII. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
Once the Supreme Court affirmed Markman’s removal of 
claim construction from juries, the crucial remaining problem was 
the lack of deference to trial court claim constructions. When the 
Federal Circuit refused to modify its de novo review process in 
Cybor, the issue continued to fester and produce repeated 
criticisms. The issue was again revised sixteen years after Cybor in 
Lighting Ballast Control v. Philips Electronics North America 
Corp.,224 but the 1995 rule of Markman was not modified until the 
Supreme Court finally spoke in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc.225 
 
A.  Lighting Ballast 
 
Lighting Ballast was the Federal Circuit’s en banc revisit of de 
novo review. The Federal Circuit again solicited amicus briefs, this 
time directed to whether Cybor should be overruled, whether 
deference should be given to the district court’s claim construction, 
and if so, how that deference should be afforded.226 The court 
received thirty-eight amicus briefs, arguing approaches that 
spanned the spectrum of potential results.227 The Federal Circuit, in 
a decision authored by Judge Newman, one of the previous staunch 
opponents of de novo review, concluded that the standard of Cybor 
should be maintained, based upon stare decisis.228 Rejecting the 
criticism of de novo review, the Federal Circuit decided that 
“[t]here has been extensive experience of Cybor in action,”229 that 
“no proponent of change has shown that de novo review of claim 
construction is unworkable,”230 so there is “neither ‘grave 
necessity’ nor ‘special justification’ for departing from Cybor.”231 
                                                                                                             
224 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
225 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
226 Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 
1272, 1277. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 1281, 1292. 
229 Id. at 1281. 
230 Id. at 1283. 
231 Id. at 1286. 
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Four judges, including the Chief Judge,232 dissented,233 but it was 
all for naught. Cybor and the de novo review standard remained 
unchanged. The stage was now set for Teva. 
 
B.  Teva 
 
The issues in Teva centered on a dispute that should not exist in 
the world of Vitronics: how to resolve the meaning of a common 
technical term that had three accepted definitions. The claims 
defined the invention in terms of “molecular weight,” which can be 
“peak average molecular weight,” “number average molecular 
weight,” or “weight average molecular weight.”234 The district 
court took testimony from experts and concluded that the term 
“molecular weight” was definite and meant “peak average 
molecular weight.”235 The Federal Circuit reviewed the decision de 
novo, disagreed, and ruled the claim indefinite.236 The Supreme 
Court thus reviewed whether the district court’s ruling should have 
been decided on the “clear error” standard applicable to findings of 
fact under Rule 52. 
The Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit in a sweeping 
rebuff of Cybor and Lighting Ballast.237 Rejecting long-cherished 
interpretations of Markman, the Supreme Court described its 
Markman holding as recognition “that in patent construction, 
subsidiary fact finding is sometimes necessary.”238 In that 
circumstance, Rule 52 “requires appellate courts to review all such 
subsidiary factual findings under the ‘clearly erroneous’ 
standard.”239 In doing so, the Supreme Court noted the obvious and 
vindicated Judge Mayer’s dissents in Cybor and Phillips: “A 
                                                                                                             
232 Id. at 1296. 
233 The dissent contended that the Cybor approach “misapprehends the 
Supreme Court’s guidance, contravenes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and adds considerable uncertainty and expense to patent litigation.” Id. at 1297 
(addressing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448). 
234 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836 (2015). 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 842. 
238 Id. at 838. 
239 Id. 
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district court judge who has presided over, and listened to, the 
entirety of a proceeding has a comparatively greater opportunity to 
gain that familiarity than an appeals court judge who must read a 
written transcript or perhaps just those portions to which the parties 
have referred.”240 
De novo review is therefore gone when the District Court 
conducts a subsidiary fact finding, and a new claim construction 
era has begun based upon a more realistic interpretation of claim 
construction. The established and now comfortable proceedings 
based on Vitronics and Philips no longer apply, and new 
procedures and new strategies will have to be developed. Yet the 
Supreme Court left the door open for the Federal Circuit to cling to 
its old practices, when it limited its ruling to circumstances where a 
district court examines extrinsic evidence, especially expert 
testimony. “As all parties agree, when the district court reviews 
only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and 
specifications, along with the patent’s prosecution history), the 
judge’s determination will amount solely to a determination of law, 
and the Court of Appeals will review that construction de novo.”241 
Just how the interplay between extrinsic and intrinsic evidence will 
occur after Teva remains to be seen. For now, two decades of 
unrealistic treatment of extrinsic evidence have been relegated to 




As Yogi Berra aptly stated, “It’s tough to make predictions, 
especially about the future.” Teva has upset the applecart, and 
long-established claim construction precedent now has 
questionable value. Recognizing that the uncertainty is great, the 
following results appear likely in the future of claim construction: 
First, the Federal Circuit will do all it can to preserve its de 
novo precedent. Where the district court makes no express fact 
findings, the Federal Circuit will decide that the trial court decision 
was entirely based on legal conclusion, so no deference and no 
                                                                                                             
240 Id. (citing similar statements by Judge O’Malley in her Lighting Ballast 
dissent, 744 F.3d 1272, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., dissenting)). 
241 Id. at 841. 
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“clear error” evaluation is needed. Indeed, most initial decisions 
rendered after Teva fit that mold—where the district court did not 
describe use of any extrinsic evidence in the district court’s 
decision, the Federal Circuit treated the matter as “business as 
usual” and evaluated the case de novo.242 Litigants, however, will 
take an entirely different view. Experts will experience a new 
popularity in claim construction, both through submission of 
declarations and through live testimony. The Federal Circuit may 
well contend that de novo review is still proper when expert 
testimony is provided by declaration (since it can review such 
testimony from the same perspective as the district court), so we 
can expect litigants to more frequently request live testimony at 
hearings. Some litigants will test the limits of testimonial evidence, 
even by proffering inventor testimony. And wily trial judges will 
reduce their chance of reversal by accepting live testimony and 
then preparing express “findings of fact” that rely on the 
testimony. Regardless, experts will now have a role extending far 
beyond merely explaining the technology. How the rules of 
evidence will be applied and evaluated on appellate review is 
likely to vary greatly across the courts. 
Second, the Teva rule will slowly erode the “public notice” 
aspect of claim construction. When the public generally and 
competitors specifically are unable to predict the testimony at 
Markman hearings, the fiction that claim interpretations are 
                                                                                                             
242 See Cadence Pharm., Inc. v. Exela Pharmasci, Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1371 
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Mobile Ideas LLC v. Apple, Inc., 780 F.3d 1159, 1172–73 
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., 778 F.3d 1021, 1023 
(Fed. Cir. 2015); In re Papst Licensing Digital Camera Patent Litig., 778 F.3d 
1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Three early Federal Circuit cases cited the Teva 
standard but did not commit to using the “clear error” standard. See Enzo 
Biochem, Ind. v. Applera Corp., 780 F.3d 1149, 1155–56 (Fed. Cir. 2015); 
Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc., 778 F.2d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
2015); Fenner Inv., Ltd. v. Cellco P’ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
Two early Federal Circuit cases found a justification to follow de novo review 
despite the presence of some extrinsic facts. See Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. 
Microstrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 680–81 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (district court’s use 
of stipulation from another litigation did not prevent de novo review); Eidos 
Display, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 779 F.3d 1360, 1365 (stating that extrinsic 
evidence considered by district court was immaterial because the intrinsic record 
is clear). 
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predictable from the intrinsic evidence will fade. We can, however, 
expect the Federal Circuit to use the need for public notice to 
justify limits on testimony—limits that are not now apparent.” 
Teva does not address other claim construction issues. Claim 
construction will still occur separate from the jury’s evaluation of 
infringement, so the whack-a-mole problem will continue. District 
courts will still want to minimize their efforts, so they will retain or 
even expand limits on the number of claims that can be interpreted, 
leading to more claim interpretation arguments before juries. 
District courts will still construe claims as a collage, mixing the 
proposals of the parties with the court’s own views, preserving one 
of the key elements of unpredictability. And the litigants and 
courts will continue to argue the meaning of simple English 
language terms such as “or,” “on,” or perhaps even “is.” Patent 
claims are written in English, a language with a rich variety of 
meaning for most every term. Uncertainty will continue to prevail. 
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